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Abstract--Analogies taken from the humanities are common epistemological means in teaching and 
explaining phenomena in sciences. This paper, however, follows a more or less opposite approach by taking 
formal and functional analogies from the sciences (uncertainty principle and symmetry) in order to 
illustrate the phenomenon of metaphor in language in an attempt to get closer to its nature, behavior and 
function. 
Interdisciplinarity characterizes current rends in sciences and humanities. This is not just a matter 
of fashion. Aristotle was still able to command all the sciences, and like a shepherd he could gather 
them as one flock into one sheepfold--philosophy. With Christianity and from the early Middle 
Ages onwards, scientific knowledge disintegrated into different branches of science and humanities 
in an accelerating way. This process has achieved an immensely high degree of specialization i
the twentieth century. This trend has been accompanied by a stronger and stronger need for 
integration within each science as well as among all sciences [1, pp. 381-413]. This began as early 
as the twelfth century with the foundation of universities and was expressed in the name itself as 
the etymology shows [unus (--one)+ verto (--to turn): universus (--turned into one, combined 
into a whole)]. 
One of the unifying principles of an integrated system of knowledge of man and his world seems 
to be the concept of symmetry [2]. 
For more than 20 years I have walked under Norman and Gothic vaults and arches, which day 
after day imposed the ideas of reflectional, rotational and translational symmetries on my mind 
(Figs 1 and 2) [3]. Tension and dynamism in my wife's designs and tapestries (and perhaps in our 
marriage) may be the manifestation of a sophisticated balance of dominating reflectional, 
translational nd color symmetries and of their absence as well (Figs 3 and 4) [4, 5]. Translational 
symmetry was probably responsible for the boredom of musical training in my childhood as well 
as for the nice melodies I cannot forget [6]. For almost 30 years I have been studying and teaching 
problems of rhythm, rhyme [7] and metaphor in literature and language and have tried to find the 
reason for their aesthetic functions. Yet, it was only recently that some works reminded me that 
a common core and connecting principle of all the above may be symmetry [2, 8-10]. 
In relation to human life the phenomenon of symmetry can be compared to health. If one is 
healthy he is not interested in it, does not take care of it and does not feel it. The presence of health 
is something unnoticed in life and the absence of it, i.e. illness, is something which is noticed and 
which directs all our attention, aims and wishes to health. Symmetry in nature and art surrounds 
us permanently, more or less unconscious in us and unnoticed by us, while the lack of it calls our 
attention to its repletive omnipresence. Such is the linearity of time in human life, this unidirectional 
and irreversible passing and lethal asymmetry of the two endpoints in our lives--birth and death. 
This personal and irreversible process of the individual pushes the human mind towards the idea 
of a bilateral reflectional symmetry, i.e. to the hope and belief of another life to come with its 
antisymmetrical items of reward and punishment. According to this there was a paradise (lost) at 
the beginning of time and there will be a paradise (regained) at the end of time and the axis of 
reflection is a Messiah in the middle of time. His person is again a symmetry in itself, the 
incarnation of divinity (Deus ~homo) and the deification of man (homo-,Deus) [11]. 
If a linguist approaches these phenomena ofsymmetry exclusively from a linguistic point of view 
and deals with the meanings of expressions he says they are metaphors. A metaphor comprehends 
a "real life", of which the traditional name is literal sense, and an "uncertain life to come", called 
f igurative sense [12, p. 3; 13, p. 552; 14]. 
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Fig. 1. The nave of St Martin's Basilica at the Archabbey of Pannonhalma, Hungary. (Photo: A. Alapfy.) 
Skipping a vast number  of  definit ions for metaphor  [15, pp. 300-331; 16, 17], I quote here a few 
examples beginning with Aristotle: 
"Metaphor is the transference of a strange name", 
in Bywater's translat ion,  
"Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else" [18, 19];
and another  one from I. A. Richards,  a great twentieth century scholar of  metaphor  esearch: 
"In the simplest formulation when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active 
together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction" 
[20, p. 93]; 
and two from two encyclopedias: 
"Metaphor. A condensed verbal relation in which an idea, image, or symbol may, by the presence of one 
or more other ideas, images, or symbols, be enhanced in vividness, complexity or breadth of imph.'cation" 
[21]; "By common definition and by etymology a metaphor is a transfer of meaning both in intension 
and extension" [22]. 
Consequently,  the term metaphor in its etymological  and wider sense means every transference 
in language, i.e. tropes (Cicero: verborum immutat io- - -changing of  words) [13, pp. 552, 553,556] 
while tradit ional ly its meaning has also been restricted to transference based on similitude, e.g. "he 
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Fig. 2. The splendid vaulting of St Benedict's Chapel at the Archabbey of Pannonhalma, Hungary. (Photo: 
A. Alapfy.) 
is a lion", which means he is as brave, as strong etc. as a lion (Cicero: verbum translatum-- 
transference of words) [13, pp. 552, 553, 556]. 
One of the most common and ridiculous superstitions of the Western civilization has been that 
metaphors (or tropes in general) are to adorn style [20, p. 90; 23, p. 359]. It is a tradition which 
may be traced back to a superficial reading of Quintilian and a fatal misunderstanding as a 
consequence of it: " . . .  there are some (i.e. tropes) which are intended solely to the purpose of 
embellishment" (eruntque quidam tantum ad speciem accomodati) [24, p. VII. VI. 5] (present 
author's italics). Several times he makes clear distinctions between tropes, which are to express 
meaning(!) and those which are to ornament speech: " . . .  some are for the sake of meaning, others 
for the sake of decoration" ( . . .  quosdam gratia significationis, quosdam decoris assumi) 
[24, p. VIII. VI. 2]; " . . .  tropes employed to express our meaning involve ornament as well, though 
Fig. 3. Struggle for Light; tapestry, wool, 150x 150 cm. Fig. 4. The Seventh Door; tapestry, wool, 122 × 172 cm. 
Designed and woven by S. t)rsi, 1978. Designed and woven by S. Orsi, 1985. 
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the converse is not the case" ( . . .  qui significandi gratia adhibentur esse et ornatum, sed non idem 
accidet contra); " . . .  to make our  meaning clearer.. ,  or to produce decorative f fect. . ."  (quia 
significantius est aut quia decentius) [24, p. VIII. VI. 6]. 
Though Quintilian was interested in the type which decorates speech, he was still aware of the 
other type as well, In doing so he relied on Aristotle, for whom the information-giving ature of 
metaphor was of vital importance [25]: 
"We will begin by remarking that we all naturally find it agreeable to get hold of new ideas easily: words 
express ideas, and therefore those words are the most agreeable that enable us to get hold of new ideas. 
Now strange words imply puzzle us; ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from 
metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh." [26] 
In any case metaphor has been a "disturbing enigma" for scholars [12, p. 13] since Aristotle. 
There are at least three reasons for this: 
(1) nature of metaphor; 
(2) birth and behavior of metaphorical relations in speech/text; 
(3) effect, function and relation of metaphor concerning human personality (think- 
ing, emotions, instincts etc.). 
According to different approaches of various disciplines to metaphor, theories have been labeled 
as comparison (Quintilian), analogy (Aristotle), interaction (Black, Richards), improper usage 
(Locke, Wittgenstein), opposition, logical absurdity (Beardsley), matter of emotion (Carnap), 
intuition (Wheelwright), substitution, similarity, juxtaposition, identity, tension, collision, fusion, 
deviance, anomaly, mistake etc. [12, p. 3; 15, pp. 300-331; 22, 27] 
This simple list of the technical terms of theories refers to the essence of metaphor: "the literal 
meaning does not disappear" [12, p. 13] but goes hand in hand with the figurative meaning in every 
moment (cf. comparison of two, interaction between two, tension between two etc.). The result is 
a tension in our mind, an oscillation [15, p. 313]. Is it a matter of empirical falsity or semantic 
anomaly [34], of relation of denotata nd/or of significata [29, p. 50], of intension and/or of 
extension [22]? When one says "Peter is a lion", he sets up a contradiction according to the rules 
of traditional logic, as he transgresses logical categories: "Peter is a man", "A lion is a lower 
animal", consequently "A man is a lower animal"! Yet we have no problem in understanding the 
sentence "Peter is a lion". Suddenly we recognize common features in Peter and in the lion (tertium 
comparationis) [19, pp. 90-92; 30, pp. 27; 38; 153]; (ground) [20, p. 93; 28, 35, pp. 25-47, 33]. We do 
not care about all the potential features of the two meanings, but simply make some of the virtual 
features actual (brave, strong etc.) [35, p. 44]. At this stage another problem arises: which features 
are actualized? Brave, strong or some others or both? Do we delete all of the potential and some 
of the virtual features? [15, pp. 302, 314]. At once we realize that the interpretation of metaphor 
is not totally uncertain, yet it is not as certain as the sentence "Peter is six feet tall" can be true. 
In addition we feel it is not just a matter of intuition vs reasonable thinking or experience. We know 
that our interpretation of a metaphor depends on context, situation, culture and education, 
personal age and historical period, just like everyday classifying (see below) [36]. That is why for 
speakers of European languages "my ducky", for example, may or may not be a nice thing to say 
to a woman but "my little elephant" certainly is not (cf. the meanings of head in English, French, 
German and Hungarian) [37]. 
The phenomenon of transgression of existing categories i common both in poetic metaphors 
as well as in new inventions in sciences. If one says "A wolf is an animal" he will classify animal 
as genus and wolf as a species omewhere under the genus animal. But if he says "A man is a wolf" 
he will not follow everyday or scientific biological experience and we could say again that he has 
violated the logical rules of classifying or a kind of tabula Porphyriana based on it 
[38, pp. 202-250, 229]. Everyday and scientific lassifying themselves may also be totally different 
without being really illogical. Everyday classifying, not unlike metaphorical classifying, may 
depend on age, education, culture and social status, period, genre and mental condition (see 
above). 
When my 3-year-old aughter consistently called every animal, even a fish on the kitchen table, 
bow-vow and every plant and flower kertyschoo, the naming was funny yet the classifying perfect, 
i.e. animal kingdom, vegetable kingdom [15, pp. 300-331; 39-45]. Similarly, when in Hebrew both 
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an eagle and a bee were called oph, that categorizing seems naive to us at first glance because we 
translate oph as bird in our system of categories. The ancient Hebrew system was unlike ours 
however. The meaning of oph was "flying being with wings" and thus, the classifying was again 
perfect [15, p. 317]. The same can be found in the distinction of meat and fish (caro vs piscis) in 
Catholic moral theology from the ancient imes throughout the Middle Ages up until modern times. 
From the viewpoint of fast (Lent), common sense and even local tradition were authoritative in
deciding what was meat and what was fish [46]. Thus, every animal that lived and breathed on 
the surface of the earth was looked at as meat--mammals, birds etc. Every animal that lived in 
and around water wasfish. Therefore, during Lent people were allowed to eat frogs, turtles, cockles, 
shellfish, crayfish, beavers, wild ducks, crakes, seagulls etc. This distinction, which included even 
mammals in the termfish ad nothing to do with science. Yet, there is a clear logic in it: the place 
of life [1, p. 402]. Something similar happens in verbal jokes as well [47]. 
As far as metaphorical language is concerned it provides a more holistic view of man and his 
ideas in everyday life even though it is not precise in a scientific way, not to mention the fact that 
it was the unusual associations and unexpected relations which helped develop natural sciences as 
well, as pointed out in the story of Newton's apple. Every invention or new idea in science is a 
kind of rebellion against and a violation of existing categories just like the language of children, 
poets and early civilization myths. In each case there is something in common: the introduction 
of new categories as a result of a new system of classifying. Therefore, a metaphor is much more 
than simply a break in the semantic isotopy of a text I15, p. 312; 48-50]. "No advance was possible 
in the intellectual life of man without metaphor." [51] 
The importance and the problems of metaphor which I have tried to sketch above may be 
responsible for the two extreme views on interpretation: one says metaphors make language totally 
obscure, while the other says they can be analyzed as exactly as facts in sciences [15, p. 323]. In 
an attempt to reach a more differentiated understanding of the problem of metaphor I introduced 
the uncertainty principle to the question in 1981 [52]. 
Then I suggested that every manifestation f a human being, first of all an artistic one, is potentia 
which is actualized, i.e. interpreted, by the recipient, another human being (in case of language). 
Consequently, what a man says is always polyvalent. It is the circumstances (who, what, to whom, 
where, why etc.) that make his utterance more or less definite. Let us try to compare metaphorical 
language with scientific language. The latter tends to be accurate, so that it expresses extremely 
little with one word and thus achieves exactness and totally excludes ambiguity. Metaphors, on 
the other hand, tell us a lot, but inexplicitly, ambiguously and in an undefined manner. Abstract 
language is subsidiary and artificial. Metaphors are not simply there to decorate language but to 
achieve conciseness, erve totality in cognition and reduce the number of signs. For instance, the 
wording of the label on a bottle of Tokay wine "Rex vinorum et vinum regum" (Wine of kings 
and king of wines) could be scientifically explained, at least in theory, but the process would fill 
books. Even in chemistry and physics approximations are often the only practicable way. Thus, 
for example, to make an exact calculation and provide a description of all possible wave functions 
of an iron atom would fill an entire library and that of a uranium atom would require more paper 
and ink than there is matter in the solar system. Or take, for example, the term "electron cloud" 
in the description of atomic structures which is one of the most telling metaphors among the many 
used in natural sciences [53]. It is important in my analogies here that metaphors are always 
"cloudy" in common experience [35, p. 47]. 
There is an uncertainty in the question of metaphor as well. We know exactly the two "names" 
(man-wolf), yet we cannot link them adequately (Fig. 5). Therefore, a literary analysis or any 
everyday interpretation cannot come near anything like a mathematical or scientific one (except 
in the case of the uncertainty principle of physics), which totally eliminates ambiguity and 
establishes equivalences and equations. Any interpretation must retain some degree of uncertainty. 
It sets only the limits within which ambiguity may exist and alternatives (fierce, hostile etc.) may 
be chosen. It offers end values (man and wolf) and the oscillation of mind can spring into existence 
in any channel (fierce, hostile etc.) between them. Consequently, the number of intepretations is 
not unlimited [37]. Ambiguity and tension remain within certain limits. For example in the famous 
metaphorical saying "Homo homini lupus"--"Man is to man a wolf" Plautus: Trinummus II.4 
[54, 38, pp. 202-250, 229], the channel can be wild, hostile, inimical, fierce etc., but obviously not 
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Fig. 5. (Drawing: M. Barab~is.) 
mild, friendly, serving, adoring etc. Otherwise it would perhaps ay: "Homo homini deus"- -"Man 
is to man a god", as Erasmus quotes it as a proverb: "Homo homini aut deus, aut lupus". The 
oscillation of mind here seems to correspond to connections between different parts of the brain. 
A metaphor makes the whole man react. In metaphorical thinking, the scholastic principle can be 
altered in the following way: "Nihil est in intellectu quod simul non sit in anima, corpore et 
sensibus"--Nothing is in the mind that is not simultaneously in the soul, body and senses (see 
below also). 
This can be illustrated by an analogy from chemistry, too. In a molecule, which is constructed 
of atoms, we know that there are certain electrons which are shared between atoms and that there 
are others which belong to individual atoms, at least to a good degree of approximation. In a 
metaphor, we also know which items of meaning can be common (hostile, fierce etc.) and which 
cannot (mild, nice etc.), but we can never be certain of the actual common one or ones (hostile 
and/or fierce etc. and/or both and/or others). This depends on the individual, his age, education 
etc. [38, p. 219]. So we must take into consideration both bonding and nonbonding electrons, using 
the molecular language vs features of meaning [10]. It seems much easier and certainly more 
clear-cut o describe the affinity and repulsion of electron pairs with one another than those in the 
meaning of a metaphorical expression. Wolves may be fierce both toward other animals and toward 
each other, may quarrel over prey and with each other etc. These relations are also defined much 
more by education, common sense etc. than biology. The two meanings in the metaphor remain 
the same, just as the two nuclei remain unchanged in the chemical bond, whereas the relationship 
between the two meanings is subject o various conditions, just as the bonding between the two 
atoms can be described, at best, by a probability distribution function of the electrons, and is more 
sensitive to changes on various conditions than the nuclear positions. While we know the number 
of chemical bonds in a molecule, we do not even know the number of features in a metaphor. We 
can speak of positions of greater and smaller symmetries and this is why, for example, "my little 
elephant" can be nice in one language and culture and insulting in another. The problem of 
certainty and uncertainty in the nature of metaphor can be revealed more closely if we take the 
concept of symmetry into consideration i a more detailed way. 
It is all the more necessary that we do this because metaphor was discovered as an example of 
symmetry as early as, at least, Shubnikov and Koptsik, though they share the common European 
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opinion of a narrow interpretation of the use of metaphor and restrict it to poetic language (cf. 
the remarks above on Quintilian): 
"A specific feature of poetry such as the metaphoric content of its language develops within a unified 
scheme of groups of projective transformations. Writing the Aristotelian metaphor in the form of ratio 
What age is so evening is
for life for day 
we find that other tropes (poetic omparisons and contrasts) are formed in an analogous manner." 
[23, p. 359] 
The concept of antisymmetry in grammatical metaphors as the unusual and parallel use of 
Hungarian plural suffixes was raised by Frnagy [15, p. 310]. 
Scientific investigations of metaphor go back to Aristotle, just as the concept of symmetry goes 
back to Greek thinking. The word ~ aotq~e~piot had various meanings, the most important of which 
were: commensurability, due proportion, symmetry, one of the characteristics of beauty and 
goodness, fixed proportion, suitable relation, convenient size and harmony of life [55]. 
In today's literature of symmetry a kind of wider sense corresponds to the Greek meanings: "A 
broader interpretation allows us to talk about degrees of symmetry, to say that something is more 
symmetrical than something else" [10]. In this sense we "call objects equal in relation to some 
particular feature if both objects possess this feature" [23, p. 1] and thus "we introduce the idea 
of two objects being more or less equal" [23, p. 1]. This type of symmetry is called "material 
symmetry" [9] and applies to metaphor while the so-called "geometrical symmetry", as a special 
kind of geometric law" [23, pp. 4, 2] and geometric regularity does not [4, 10, 56]. I use the terms 
bilateral, rotational, translational nd color symmetries as well as asymmetry in the sense in which 
they are generally accepted and established in the literature [2, 10, 23, p. 359; 57~50]. 
If we consider the symmetry of the sentence "A wolf is an animal" from a logical point of view, 
i.e. we categorize the animal as genus, the wolf as a species of it, we shall find reflectional symmetry 
and asymmetry in their extensional relation as the set of animals includes the set of wolves (Fig. 
6). A similar symmetry and asymmetry can be found in their intensional relation but in a reciprocal 
way, as the set of features of a wolf includes a set of animal features (Fig. 7). This symmetry and 
asymmetry is also present in a simple sketch of the dichotomic structure or binary oppositions of 




J \  
animal kingdom vegetable kingdom 
J \  





living be ings  inanimate beings 
( + being ( + being 
+ living) - living) 
The symmetry is in the feature being which exists in both; the asymmetry, or at best antisymmetry 
(traditionally called differentia specifica), is in the features living-inanimate, with the feature living 
existing in one and missing in the other etc. This is why it could also be looked at as antisymmetry. 
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Now let us see what happens if we say "A man is a wolf". We disregard the system of Tabula 
Porphyriana in this sentence, regardless of whether our tabula is based on science or is determined 
by culture, language tc. (see the examples offish, bird etc. above), as if wolf were a genus and 
man a species of it: 
wolf 
\ \ \ \  
man 
while according to the common system, man and wolf are both species omewhere under different 
generi, as can be seen quite clearly even in a mere sketch: 
animal kingdom 
man other animals 
J 
wolf 
Yet, we cannot say that the sentence "A man is a wolf" is simply illogical and violates the rules 
of thinking and of language because we--in a European culture-can understand it without 
difficulty. The solution to the problem, I think, is in the existence of the above-mentioned 
uncertainty in the symmetry and asymmetry of the meanings in the sentence, not to mention that 
it is symmetrical nd asymmetrical even in its acoustic or written form: 
I 
I 
A man is a wolf 
I 
I 
where the copula is is the axis of reflection or the border of translation. Metaphorical relation is 
a kind of mirror which is polished semantically, socially and culturally (cf. the example "little 
elephant" above). 
Now let us suppose that the two meanings (man-wolf)  are two different and amorphous objects 
opposite each other. They can both be turned in space separately in every direction. Both have 
certain parts on their surfaces which are identical or similar either in shape or color (fierce, hostile 
etc.). Consequently, if we turn them continuously there will be certain moments and stages when 
identical or similar parts face each other (fierce-fierce tc.) or are back to back. The two objects 
(man-wolf) in and of themselves are asymmetric, but in the above-mentioned moments and stages 
symmetries arise between parts. This is when we discover common features of man and wolf(hostile, 
fierce etc.). The probability of such turnings depends on the number of identical or similar parts, 
on the speed and direction of the turnings and the cleverness of the person who is turning them 
(cf. the problem of the Rubik cube, and see Fig. 8). If one is clever, the probability of symmetrical 
stages in an interval grows and the frequency and probability of the returning of such stages will 
be more or less stabilized (cf. the problem of certainty and uncertainty of metaphor as discussed 
above). This means that a clever person can identify more common features of man and wolf more 
quickly than others. We can make this play more complicated and refined and put a lens between 
the objects. In this case the work of the lens will also depend on the distance of the objects from 
the lens and on the nature of lens itself. Such lenses can be culture, education, age etc., as above. 
Therefore, let us add omnidirectional motion in space to the earlier rotation of the two objects. 
Then theoretically there will be more possible stages of symmetry as the lens can enlarge or reduce 
shapes, i.e. a square of this size [3, for example, can be symmetrically adequate with this size [ ]  
etc. (see Fig. 9). If the lens in question happens to be a fish-eye then a shape O can be symmetrical 
with c:::~. That is why "my little elephant" can be nice---depending on the cultural ens. 
Symmetry in metaphors 705 




The two meanings in metaphor are amorphous in comparison with one another. Yet, there are 
more or less symmetrical items (fierce, hostile etc.) in them while others are asymmetrical. The 
existence of items belong to the possibility of the objective, external world (cf. potentia above). 
Whether they appear or are thought or recognized as symmetries (cf. actualization above) depends 
on two main groups of conditions: one is the rotational and omnidirectional motion, which is the 
brightness and cleverness of the speaker; the other is the mirror or lens/lenses and the objects, the 
type of lens, the type of amorphous object--which is the individual's language, culture, education, 
age, historical period, social status, context, situation etc. (cf. the "circumstantiae" in classical 
rhetoric) [13, pp. 91,139, 377, 399 etc.]. These result various values which can be subdivided as 
aesthetics, knowledge-invention, emotional tension, humor, poeticity etc. The two main factors 
(motions and lens + object) define the borders of metaphor-nonmetaphor in an exact and precise 
way. Within these borders one stage, one moment (fierce or hostile or wild etc.), i.e. the appearance 
of metaphor/symmetry as metaphor/symmetry, is more or less uncertain. 
By means of this model the nature, behavior and effect of metaphor can be described--I am 
convinced--more precisely and exactly than ever. It comprehends several different characteristics 
of metaphor which have been emphasized separately by various approaches, and provides an 
explanation ofthe tension, oscillation, cognitive and emotional procedures, invention and poeticity, 
and the role of science and art in our mind and life. It also alludes to the relationship between 
the external world and the world in language (cf. Pet6fi's TeSWest heory: text structure--world 
structure) [61], which is a kind of symmetry as complicated as symmetry in metaphor. Besides, it 
reminds us of the external, formal symmetry of the shape of neocortex, which is the material source 
of the metaphorical operations discussed above. There may also be a functional connection between 
metaphoric thinking and the structure and working of the brain. 
Fig. 9 
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Since Sperry's experiments the research of left and right hemispheres has become fashionable 
[15, p. 324; 62, 63]. It is widely known that the left hemisphere is the center of abstraction and 
speech, while the right hemisphere is the center of music and iconic thinking. It is also well-known 
that there has been a contradiction in localizing certain functions in the brain. Lashley's 
experiments seemed to prove there is no special place of memory in the brain, while Penfield 
succeeded in connecting certain senses to certain neurons [62, pp. 201-204]. I f  certain parts of the 
neocortex are cut out, other parts may take over their functions--primarily in childhood. This 
contradiction and uncertainty of definite localization and the possibility of the changing place of 
functions eems to correspond to the unpredictability in metaphorizing which is, at the same time, 
predictable within certain limits in its special symmetry, as we have seen above. The brain as a 
whole (including the limbic system, the center of emotions and other parts) is the same in every 
man, though not regarding the level of neurons and their connections. A certain connection is 
established within one man's brain but not in another's, though the neural possibilities are more 
or less equally given (cf. determination by age, education, culture etc. above). I f  the neural 
connection is produced, it is not sure that the neural route is the same. The length and number 
of intermediate connections on it can be different and can exist in parallel [64]. This also seems 
to correspond to the special uncertainty and symmetry of semantic features in metaphor which can 
be produced by various rotations etc. in our model. Consequently, both the nature of the brain 
and the nature of the metaphorizing mind include a kind of risk, not unlike human life itself 
[65, pp. 1, 9], which is not limitless in either case (see the introductory remarks to this paper). 
Degrees of risk in finding symmetry in language and art consist of a wide range of chances (cf. 
Figs 1-4). The use of metaphor in language--as I hope I have proven-- is a "carefully calculated 
risk" [65, p. 94] as metaphor connects known and unknown as a means of requiring a knowledge 
of unknown via known [26, 38, p. 217], art and inventions are also adventures into an unknown 
part of the world with the purpose of making it known. In the symmetry of metaphor- -one could 
say--the unknown is reflected by the known. At the same time the concept and existence of 
symmetry itself ensures the limits of risk. This anxiety and hope is expressed by Black and Boyd: 
"No doubt metaphors are dangerous--and perhaps especially so in philosophy. But a prohibition against 
their use would be a willful and harmful restriction upon our power of inquiry." [35, p. 47]; 
"The use of metaphor isone of many devices available to the scientific community oaccomplish t e task 
of accommodation f language to the casual structure of the world" [66]. 
This accommodation by metaphors belongs to the most routine of human acts, so much so that 
it is taken to extremes even when used without similarity, e.g. in the physics of quarks where there 
are technical terms like "naked charm state" and "naked bottom state" [1, pp. 381-413; 67]. That 
is why I think Petrfi is perfectly fight in saying that "normal and figurative messages can be handled 
in the same way" (see also the everyday and scientific classifying above) [68]. I also hope that the 
introduction of the correlation of the uncertainty principle and symmetry in metaphor may be 
fruitful and stimulating for modeling facts in natural sciences. The risk of certainty and uncertainty, 
the struggle to reduce it and keep it to a limited extent, to evaluate and ramify it in metaphor has 
removed the concept of metaphorical symmetry from the geometrical one. Yet, the key to the 
enigma of metaphor may also be the uncertainty principle in symmetry. 
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